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In this paper we construct two measures of the monetary policy stance. 
The stance of monetary policy, regarded as a quantitative measure of whether 
the policy is too tight, neutral, or too loose relative to objectives of stable prices 
and output growth, is useful and important for at least two reasons.  First, it 
helps the authority (central bank) to determine the course of monetary policy 
needed to keep the objective (goals) within the target range.  Secondly, a 
quantitative measure of the stance is important for an empirical study of the 
transmission of monetary policy actions through the economy. Measuring the 
stance of the monetary policy free from any criticism, however, is not an easy 
task. As pointed out by Gecchetti (1994), “there seems to be no way to measure 
monetary actions that does not raise serious objections”. 
Our results show that an individual coefficient Monetary Condition Index 
(MCI) performs better than both the summarised MCI coefficient and the 
Overall measure proposed by Bernanke and Mihov (1998). The results show that 
in the 21-year period from 1984 to 2004, the demand shocks have dominated for 
about eight years. The MCI (IS-Individual coefficient) can explain six of them. 
However, it indicates the negative demand shock in two years as neutral. The 
other two measures, however, fail to capture demand shocks most of the time. 
This analysis suggests that the MCI (IS-Individual coefficient) plays an 
important role in determining output and inflation when the economy is not 
dominated by supply shocks. The results also show that supply shocks are 
dominant in the case of Pakistan. Furthermore, the exchange rate channel is 
more important than the interest rate channel. 
 
JEL classification:  E42, E52, E58 
Keywords:  Monetary Policy Measures, Monetary Condition Index, 





Monetary authority, with the responsibility of keeping the economy in the 
line with policy objectives, needs policy stance to full fill this responsibility.  
The stance of monetary policy is defined as quantitative measure of whether 
policy is too tight, Neutral or too loose relative to objectives (stable prices and 
output growth) of monetary policy.
1 Accurate measurement of policy stance is 
important for the evaluation of alternative theories of transmission, or to obtain 
quantitative estimates of monetary policy changes on output and inflation 
[Bernanke and Mihov (1998)].  Measuring the stance of monetary policy is, 
however, not an easy task. If the monetary policy is reaching to state of 
economy, then it is unlikely to influence the economic performance in the 
current period, however the exogenous part of monetary policy is likely to 
influence the economic performance.  
A variety of empirical approaches have been used to measure the policy 
stance, by different researchers. The traditional approach is to use a single 
variable (such as monetary aggregate or discount rate) as policy measure. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) advocate the innovations in the monetary 
aggregates as a good approximate measure of monetary policy shocks. But some 
puzzling characteristics in subsequent economic development following money 
stock innovations have been identified for example ‘liquidity puzzle”
2. An 
increase in interest rate following the innovations in monetary aggregates is 
evident from empirical analysis [Leeper and Gordon (1992)]. Furthermore, 
money growth rate may not distinguish between changes in money demand and 
changes in supply. Besides financial innovations, deregulations rendered the use 
of money growth rates as measure of direction of policy. The recognition that 
traditional approach of identify monetary policy shocks with changes in 
monetary aggregate is misleading encouraged the Bernanke (1992) and Sims 
(1992) to use innovation in interest rate as a measure of monetary policy change. 
However, this created addition challenges known as “price puzzle”
3. Another 
common puzzle is that positive innovation in interest rates is followed by 
depreciation of local currency rather than appreciation, exchange rate puzzle 
[Sim (1992) and Grilli and Roubini (1998)]. Therefore the use of the changes in 
                                                 
1See Bernanke and Mihov (1998). 
2With monetary contraction, the interest rate decreases rather than increases. See Sim and 
Zha (1998). 
3With positive innovations in interest rate, the prices increase rather than decrease. See Sim 
(1990).   2 
these variables as policy measure becomes ambiguous. To solve these problems 
some strategies have been pursued in the literature.  
Some studied [Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992)] consider 
that the federal funds rate could be a better indicator of policy stance.  However 
other [Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)], suggest quantity of non-borrowed 
reserves as an indicator of monetary policy. But the problem with these 
measures of policy is that they presume a constant set of operating procedure by 
authorities (Fund-rate or non-borrowed reserves based procedure). 
Strongin (1992) argued that authority is constrained to meet total 
resources demand in the short run, but can effectively tighten policy by reducing 
non-borrowed reserves and forcing banks to borrow more from the discount 
window. Econometrically, this approach has an edge over the earlier two 
approaches i.e. it is able to test alternative operating procedures (Bernanke-
Blinder and Christiano-Eichenbaum). Though the main focus of all the three 
studies are on the measurement of monetary policy innovation, these also 
suggest some potentially interesting indicators of overall policy’s stances. 
Armour, et al. (1996) is of the view that innovation in overnight rate could be a 
good measure of policy innovations in case of Canada’s monetary policy. Fung 
and Kasumovich (1998) suggest that M1 innovations produces inputs responses 
that are consistent with what one would expect from a monetary policy shock. 
Several authors [e.g. Laurent (1988); Goodfriend (1991) and Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1996)] have suggest the term spread as an alternative measure of 
policy. They based their argument on Central bank actions to change shot-term 
interest rate and market participant’s expectations about this change. For 
example if they expect the short-term rate to return gradually back to the starting 
value in future, then long rate will change less than short rate, on the other hand 
if market participants expect that this change is just the first stage of longer 
sequence of change, then long rate will move by more than short rate.   
Therefore, term spread i.e. difference between short-term rate and long-term rate 
is important to include in monetary policy analysis.   
All these studies assumed a priori that a single financial variable is the 
best policy indicators.  However, there exists little agreement on which single 
variable must accurately captures the stance of policy [Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998)].  
Due to the disagreement about the use of single variable as a policy 
indicator, the composite measures have been developed and used as a policy 
indicator. The Bank of Canada uses monetary condition index (MCI), which is 
weighted sum of changes in interest rate and exchange rate from given base 
period, as measure of policy stance.  MCI, however, is criticised due to many 
reasons.  First, is that it reflects changes in interest rate and exchange rate that 
are not related to central bank policy.  Second, MCI does not consider other 
financial variables that may be important in transmission mechanism.   3 
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) suggested a VAR methodology that can 
include all the policy variables previously proposed for the United States as 
particular specifications of general model.  This approach need not assume that a 
single variable is the best indicator of monetary policy.  Fung and Yuan (2001) 
apply Bernanke and Mihov methodology to Canada.  They assumed policy 
stance, though unobserved, is reflected in the behaviour of financial variables.  
They consider four financial variables, M1, the term spread, the overnight rate, 
and exchange rate.         
Romer and Romer (1989) adopted a “narrative approach” to address the 
identification problems highlighted by the time series models. Based on their 
reading of Federal Reserve documents, the Romers’ created a dummy variable 
for periods when the Fed contracted to offset inflationary pressures. They argued 
that responses of out-put and unemployment to such identified monetary policy 
contractions demonstrates that monetary policy has strong and persistent real 
effects on the economy. 
This measure of monetary policy shocks got acceptance as a standard 
indicator of monetary policy [Norrbin (2000)]. The appealing aspects of this 
approach are that it uses additional information and is nonparametric
4. But this 
approach suffers from the problems of subjectivity and endogeniety [Leeper 
(1993, 1997) and Sims and Zha (1993)].
5  Furthermore it considers movements 
in only contractionary direction, besides makes no distinctions between mildly 
and severely contractionary episodes [Bernanke and Mihov (1998)]. 
Boschen and Mills (1991) developed a monthly index that not only 
considers the expansionary episodes but also makes distinctions between 
“strongly”, “neutral”, and “mildly contractionary/expansionary” episodes. 
Though more information are used in this measure and it also provides a more 
continuous measure than Romer’s does but other two problems i.e. subjectivity 
and endogeniety becomes more severe. 
Bagliano, et al. (1999) further extended this narrative approach to an 
open economy. But identification of interest rate movements as monetary 
policy changes becomes more difficult due to simultaneity problem of 
exchange rate and interest rate [Norbin (2000)]. Other also attempt to extend 
the Romer’s approach [for example Skimmer and Zettelmeyer (1996) and 
Rudebusch (1996)]. Skimmer and Zettelmeyer use a change in three months 
interest rate instead of dummy. However, this approach also suffers from 
endogeneity problem [Norrbin (2000)]. Rudebusch (1996) creates an 
unexpected change in interest rate from 30-day Fed fund contracts. The 
problem with this estimate is that it measures all unexpected movements in 
                                                 
4See Bernanke and Mihov (1998). 
5The problem of subjectivity arises as this approach depends on the interpretation of 
economists as some one has to interpret the central bank action to determine whether shock has 
occurred.   4 
interest rate not only such that associated with Federal Reserve 
announcements [Norrbin (2000)].  
There is only study for Pakistan by Qayyum (2002) that measures 
Monetary Condition Index. Our study is different in that we construct two 
composite measures i.e. Monetary Condition Index (MCI) and measure 
developed by Bernanke and Mihov (1998). We then compare both measures on 
the basis of performance criteria i.e. the consistency of estimated weights with 
economic theory, visual inspection vis-à-vis output growth as well as changes in 
inflation (Graphical inspection of turning points), its dynamic correlation with 
output and growth and inflation. We use monthly data from 1982 to 2005 for 
Pakistan.  
The plan of the study is as: in Section 2 methodologies are discussed, the 
empirical results are given in Section 3, in Section 4 a comparison of the two 
measures is made, while Section 5 summarises. 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we present the methodologies to construct two composite 
measures i.e. MCI and overall measure [developed by Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998)].  
 
2.1. Monetary Condition Index (MCI)  
The bank of Canada was first to develop and use MCI as policy indicator. 
The MCI is a weighted sum of changes in short term interest rate and exchange 
rate relative to the values in a base period. Algebraically  
MCIt = ωer (ert – er0) + ωi
  (it – i0) 
Where ωe and
 ωi are weights assigned to exchange rate and interest rate, t = 0 is 
base period, and ωer
 + ωi
  = 1. 
MCI is, however, subject to many criticisms [Ericsson, et al. (1998); 
Batini and Nilson (2002)]. These include:  Model dependency, ignored 
dynamics, parameter inconsistency, and non-exogeneity of regressors. 
In light of criticism on MCI, Gauthier, et al. (2004) suggested some 
methods that could improve the construction of MCI. In the first method weights 
are derived from reduced form IS-PC Framework. The weights are obtained by 
summing up the coefficients on the lags variables as well as by including 
individual lags in MCI to take into account the dynamics of those variables over 
time. The second method derives weights based on generalised impulse-
response function from a VAR, and the 3
rd method derives weights based on 
factor analysis. The last two methods avoid the non-exogeneity and model 
dependency problem. We use 1st method to derive weights. This method was 
first adopted in the construction of MCI at Banks of Canada. [i.e. Duguay 
(1994)] and is a popular methodology. Model used for this purpose usually   5 
consist of an IS-Philips curve. For example, in Duguay (1994), the IS curve 
relates the components of the MCI (the interest rate and exchange rate) to output 
growth controlling for external output, commodity prices, and fiscal policy. The 
Phillips curve provides the relationship between the output gap and inflation, 
controlling for expectation. 
We adopt a framework similar to this approach. Our model consist of a 
backward-looking IS curve and a backward-looking Phillips curve. 


















1    …  …  (1) 

















  … … …  (2) 
Where Yt is output (manufacturing production index MPI as proxy in case of 
monthly data), πt is inflation rate, xi is component i of MCI, here x = {interest 
rate, exchange rate}.  
 
2.2.  The Bernanke and Mihov Overall Measure
6  
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) use a semi structural VAR-based 
methodology to construct a composite measure of policy stance. This measure is 
a linear combination of all the potential candidates of policy indicators. The 
advantage of this approach over MCI is that it considers financial variables 
which may be important in monetary transmission mechanism. This method has 
several advantages over other approaches as suggested by Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998). First, it nests the quantitative indicators of monetary policy. Second, it is 
applicable to other countries and periods, and to alternative institutional setups. 
There methodology is discussed below. 
Suppose that the “true” economic structure is the following unrestricted 
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i t i t V A P G Y D P
0 0
  … … … …  (4) 
Where Bi, Ci, A
y, Gi and A
p are square matrix of coefficients. Y is non-policy 
block of variables and P is block of policy variables. Variables included in non-
policy block are real GDP(y), CPI (p), and world commodity price (wcp). World 
commodity price are used to avoid price puzzle. Variables included in policy 
                                                 
6This section heavily depends on  Bernanke and Mihov (1998).   6 
block are call money rate (i), exchange rate(er), term-spread (ts), and monetary 
aggregate (m2).  
  One element, say V
s of the set of shocks 
p
t V  in Equation (4) can 
denotes the shock to monetary policy. For the identification of V
s and dynamic 
responses to shock, we assume that innovations to variables in policy block do 
not affect variables in non policy block within that period i.e., C0=0. So 
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Comparison of Equations (5) and (6) with Equations (3) and (4) implies 
that 
or
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t V A U G U + = 0   … … … … …  (7) 
  Equation (7), a standard structural VAR system, relates observable 
VAR-based residuals 
p
t U  to unobservable structural shocks V.  The inversion of 
the Equation (7) gives us structural shocks 
p
t U including the exogenous 
monetary shock V
s. 




t U G I A V ) ( ) ( 0
1 − =
−   … … … … …  (8) 
Given the estimates of the VAR we can obtain the following vector of 
variables. 
p G A
p ) 1 ( ) ( 0
1 −
−   … … … … … …  (9) 
Estimated linear combination of policy variables included in P can be 
used to measure policy stance, including both endogenous and endogenous 
portions of policy, shock to this measure represents the exogenous monetary 
policy shock. 
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1
1
0 0 0 1
1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1
3 2 1
 …  … (10)   7 
Equation (10) can be inverted to determine how the monetary policy 
shock, V
s, depends on the VAR residuals.  
Therefore we can write policy shock as, 
   er er i i ts ts m m
s U U U U V ω ω ω ω + + + =     … … …  (11) 
In similar way other structural shocks can be obtained. 
Equation (11) shows that monetary policy shock is a linear combination 
of all VAR residuals in policy block, with weight on each variable as given 
above. A measure of policy can be constructed using same corresponding weight 
on variables. 
Model is under identified as 14 unknowns are to be estimated from 10 
residual variances and covariance. We need four more restrictions for 
identification of model. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) impose enough 
restrictions to just identify the model, which allows the derivation of a 
measure of policy stance as a linear combination of all the policy variables. 
We adopt the same strategy by choosing restrictions in such a way that 
weight on each variable remain non-zero and avoiding the imposition of too 
many restrictions. 
For identification purpose we impose restrictions as follow, 
0 0 0 3 2 1 = ϕ = = =
d and   γ , γ , γ  … … … …  (12)   
First three restrictions imply that the innovations in exchange rate do not 
respond to any other variable contemporaneously and this is purely stochastic. 
The last restriction implies that the bank fully offsets the shock to money 
demand to keep the overnight rate from changing. Therefore we can write 
weights as: 
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We can  obtain policy shock using Equation (11)                                                                                                                            
 
3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section we present the empirical results for the two measures 
discussed in previous section. Since some of the data series are not stationary, 
we take appropriate difference on the basis of seasonal unit root test, to make the   8 
series stationary.
7 We take first difference of m2, wcp, and s as we find the unit 
roots at zero frequency in case of all these series. However, we the take 12th 
difference of y as we find the seasonal unit roots at π/6 frequency. We use these 
differences in further analysis. 
 
(i) Monetary Condition Index 
We estimate the Equations (1) and (2) and obtained following results for 
the two equations. 
12 10 1 14 5 2
11 10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1
002 . 0 002 . 0 002 . 0 8 . 10 3 . 11 2 . 10
7 . 7 30 . 0 43 . 0 55 . 0 59 . 0 56 . 0
58 . 0 55 . 0 58 . 0 45 . 0 46 . 0 48 . 0
− − − − − −
− − − − −
− − − − − −
− − − + − −
− − − − − −
− − − − − − =
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
i i i er er er
er y y y y y
y y y y y y y
 
and 
12 11 10 9 8
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
5 . 3 2 . 0 4 . 0 3 . 0 5 . 0
5 . 0 4 . 0 5 . 0 6 . 0 6 . 0 8 . 0 8 . 0
− − − − −
− − − − − − −
− π − π − π − π −
π − π − π − π − π − π − π − = π
t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
y
 
weights for summarised coefficients MCI are obtained as: 
07 . 40 8 . 10 3 . 11 2 . 10 7 . 7 1 = + + + = ω  
















= ωi  
We take only those coefficients which are statistically significant
8. Weights for 
individual coefficients MCI are obtained by dividing individual coefficients on 
sum= 2 1 ω + ω . i.e.  j t i − ω ,  =
ω ω + 2 1
t coefficien lag jth
,  where i=1, 2, 1 stands for 
exchange rate and 2 for interest rate and j for lag corresponding to the 
coefficient. These weights are given in the Table 1 below.           
 
 
                                                 
7Seasonal unit root test is employed following Beaulieu and Miron (1993), who extended 
the HEGY (1990) procedure to monthly context. Result are not reported here to save the time and 
space. 
8Our Philips curve does not play any role in analysis, beyond ensuring theoretical desirable 
properties of our observed data.   9 
Table 1 
Weights for Individual Coefficients 
t , 1 ω        2 , 1 − ω t   5 , 1 − ω t   14 , 1 − ω t   1 , 2 − ω t   10 , 2 − ω t   12 , 2 − ω t  
0.19 0.26 0.28 0.27  0.00004  0.00004  0.00005 
 
We then constructed monetary condition index (summarised coefficient) as: 
MCIt = ωe (ert – er0) + ωi (it – i0),  we chose 1992:02 as base period. 
 
Then monetary condition index (individual coefficient) is constructed as: 
MCIt = ∑ωi,t-j (xi,t–j – xi0), where xi0 is value of variable in the base period. 
 
(ii)  Bernanke and Mihov Measure 
We estimate the seven variables model given by (5) and (6) using vector 
autoregressive methodology. The variables included in non-policy block are; 
industrial production index, inflation rate, and world commodity prices. While 
in policy block we include; monetary aggregate M2, interest rate spread, 
exchange rate, and market interest rate. We store the reduced form residuals so 






x by putting restrictions given by (12). These values are given in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 
Estimates of Parameters 
β  0.01(3.4) 
α
d   10.8(4.1) 
α
s   –0.9(2.97) 
α
x   27.9(5.2) 
φ
b   –0.9(2.5) 
φ
x   10.1(1.98) 
 
All the parameters estimated are statistically significant. The market 
interest rate elasticity of money demand, β, is estimated to be 0.01. α
d has a 
positive sign and significant which implies that when a positive demand shock 
occurs, market rate rises to clear the market. The parameter estimate α
s = –0.9 
shows that term spread declines 90 basis points when market rate rises by 100 
points. The sign could be positive or negative depending upon which of the two 
offsetting effects of monetary policy shock i.e. liquidity effect and expected-
inflation effect is dominant. The estimated value of the parameter φ
b is –0.9 
implies that when appositive innovation occurs in term spread. The market rate   10
is raised in response to unexpected currency depreciation, resulting in positive 
sign of φ
x. An unexpected currency depreciation would lead to an increase in 
market rate, hence α
x>0. 
We obtained weights ωm,  ωts,  ωi, and ωer using Equation (13). These 
weights are normalised i.e. ∑ωj = 1 and given below. 
 
Table 3 
Weights for the Overall Measure 
ωm   ωts  ωi   ωer  
–0.20 0.02  0.02 –0.75 
 
Then we obtained over all measure as:  
V
s = ωmmt + ωtstst + ωiit + ωer ert 
 
4.  MONETARY CONDITION INDEX VERSUS  
THE BERNANKE-MIHOV MEASURE 
Regarding the first criteria by which we judge the performance of our 
different policy measures is consistency of estimated weights with economic 
theory, the inspection of tables above reveals that our summarised coefficient 
MCI has estimated weights for market interest rate(i) and real exchange rate(er), 
–0.0001 and –0.999 respectively. The weights for interest rate(i) has negative 
sign, as higher interest rate mean lower investment and hence lower output 
growth. The weight of real exchange rate is also negative, however it could be 
positive or negative as it effect economic activities in different ways and sign 
depends upon which of effects is dominant. The weight for interest rate is much 
smaller as compared to exchange rate, which shows that exchange rate has 
dominant role in the economy. 
The weights obtained for individual coefficients MCI are all negative (as 
coefficients of both exchange rate and interest rate are negative for all lags).  
The weights obtained for Bernanke-Mihov Measure are also consistent 
with theory. The weight for market interest rate is positive which mean higher 
interest implies strong monetary policy and vice versa. The sign of weight for 
exchange rate is negative which means that appreciation of domestic currency 
implies lose monetary policy which could be possible because of 
multidimensional effects of exchange rate on output growth. The weight for 
monetary aggregate M2 is negative which implies higher growth of M2 will 
result into higher output growth i.e. lose monetary policy. The weight for 
interest rate spread is also positive which means that if short run rate is higher 
relative to long-run rate, this implies expansionary monetary policy. We want to 
make here clear that the weights for two measures are obtained using different   11
techniques; therefore these are interpreted in different ways. The weights for 
MCI are obtained by OLS regression of y on i and er while weights for 
Bernanke-Mihov Measure are obtained by using VAR approach. second 
criterion is to see the Dynamic Correlations between Output-Growth/change in 
Inflation   and different measures. We can see in Table 4 below that MCI (IS-
individual coefficients) has stronger and negative correlations with output-
growth at different lags.  Although MCI (IS-summarised coefficients) has higher  
 
Table 4 
Dynamic Correlations between Output-Growth/  
Inflation and Different Measures 





















0 –0.08  0.03  –0.13  –0.02 0.02 0.01 
1 –0.14  0.05  –0.01  0.04 –0.06  0.03 
2 –0.07  0.02  –0.08  –0.02 0.03  –0.01 
3 –0.07  –0.05  –0.07  –0.01 0.04  –0.10 
4 –0.10  0.08  –0.04  –0.05 –0.02  0.09 
5 –0.10  –0.01  –0.03  –0.05 –0.03 –0.03 
6 –0.13  0.04  –0.002  0.03 –0.04  0.03 
7 –0.06  0.08  –0.07  –0.04 0.04 0.08 
8 –0.11  –0.01  –0.001  –0.10 –0.01 –0.02 
9 –0.07  –0.01  0.04  0.03 0.02  –0.06 
10 –0.11  0.09  –0.08  –0.01 –0.003 0.08 
11 –0.07  0.04  –0.12  –0.07 0.03 0.02 
12 –0.13  –0.02  0.07  –0.07 –0.05 –0.05 
 
correlation with output-growth at zero and 11th lags but MCI (IS-individual 
coefficients) has stronger correlations at other lags. The correlations of 
Bernanke-Mihov Measure are low with both output-growth and change in 
inflation almost at all lags. 
The third criterion by which we compare the performance of our 
measures is visual inspection vis-à-vis output growth as well as changes in 
inflation (Graphical inspection of turning points). Figure 1 compares different 
measures with output-growth while Figure 2 compares different measures with 
change in inflation.  Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b) show that both MCIs perform 
well as upturns of output-growth match with downturns of MCIs and vice versa,   12
which implies that higher output-growth is associated with expansionary policy 
while lower output-growth is associated with tighter monetary policy.  Figure 
1(c) shows that Bernanke-Mihov Measure catches the turning points of output-
growth in advance only after 2000. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the 
inspection of Figure 2. In this case upturns and downturns of MCIs catch 
respectively the downturns and upturns of change in inflation in advance. This 
confirms the idea that inflation responds slowly, as compared to output-growth, 
to policy induced change and policy has real effects in short run. On the basis of 
performance criteria the summarised coefficient MCI works well.  
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The stance indices from 1984 to 2004 and 1-year output growth and changes 
in inflation for each year are presented in table 5 below.
9  The stances are normalised 
to a scale of –2 to 2: –2 to –1 denotes” very loose” to “mildly loose”, 0 denotes 
“neutral”, 1 to 2 denotes “mildly tight” to “very tight”. In last column, each year is 
labeled as demand shock (D)- or supply shock (S)-dominated according to co-
movements of output growth and inflation. In any given year, if output and inflation 
move in same direction, the year is considered to be demand-shock-dominated; 
otherwise it is considered as supply-shock-dominated. If output and inflation both 
increase together then it is positive demand shock and if both decrease together then 
it is negative demand shock. Similarly if output increases but inflation decreases then 
                                                 
9The indices for each year are the average of the months of that year. Same is for output 
growth and changes in inflation.   14
it is positive supply shock and if the case is opposite then it is negative supply shock. 
In 21-year period from 1984 to 2004, we see that demand shocks have dominated for 
about 8 years. MCI (IS-Individual coefficient) can explain 6 of them (assuming that 
policy affects the economy with a lag of 1-year): 1985; 1990; 1994-95; and 1999-
2000. Policy indicates the negative demand shock in 1988 and 1992 as neutral. The 
other two measures, however fail to capture demand shocks most of the times. This 
analysis suggests that MCI (IS-Summarised coefficient) plays an important role in 
determining output and inflation when the economy is not dominated by supply 
shocks. 
Table 5 
Numerical Presentation of Policy Stance, 1984 to 2004 
Year  Yt–Yt–12  πt  πt–12  MS(MCI1)  MS (CM)  MS(MCI2)  D or S 
1984 0.100396 –0.00316  2  –2  –1  +s 
1985  –0.13393  –0.01552  0  –2 –1 –d 
1986 0.011812 –0.00746  1  –1  0  +s 
1987 0.026458 –0.00243  0  –1  0  +s 
1988 –0.10167 –0.01009  0  –1  0  –d 
1989 0.057374 –0.00985  1  –1  0  +s 
1990 –0.0072 –0.00251  1  0  0  –d 
1991 0.03038 –0.00575  0  0  0  +s 
1992 –0.21404 –0.00367  0  0  0  –d 
1993 0.203708 –0.00691  1  0  0  +s 
1994 –0.0683 0.001217  1  0  0  –s 
1995 –0.00823 –0.00794  –1  0  0  –d 
1996 0.043372 0.005055  1  1  0  +d 
1997 0.130508 –0.02054  –2  1  0  +s 
1998 –0.12201 0.003003  –2  1  1  –s 
1999 0.064699 0.000671  1  1  1  +d 
2000 –0.11179 –0.00653  0  1  1  –d 
2001 0.010272 –0.00445  –1  1  1  +s 
2002 –0.17505 0.000907  –1  1  1  –s 
2003 0.00848 –0.00493  –1  1  1  +s 
2004 0.120503 –0.00758  0  1  1  +s 
 
5.  SUMMERY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we provide a brief detail of different measures of policy 
stance discussed in the literature. The stance of monetary policy, regarded as a 
quantitative measure of whether policy is too tight, Neutral or too loose relative 
to objectives of stable prices and output growth, is useful and important for at 
least two reasons.  Firstly it helps the authority (central Bank) determine the 
course of monetary policy needed to keep the objective (goals) with in the target 
range.  Secondly, a quantitative measure of stance is important for empirical 
study of the transmission of monetary policy actions through the economy. 
Measuring the stance of monetary policy free from criticism is, however, not an 
easy task. As rightly pointed out by Gecchetti (1994) that” there seems to be no 
way to measure monetary actions that does not raise serious objections.   15
A variety of empirical approaches have been used to measure the 
policy stance, by different researchers.  Traditionally changes in interest rate 
or some monetary aggregates were considered as monetary policy stance. 
But some puzzling characteristics were associated with these changes. To 
solve this problem two basic strategies have been pursued in the literature. 
The first in “the narrative approach” and second approach is in the tradition 
of “vector auto regression (VAR) literature”. Earlier VAR approaches 
consider shocks to a single variable an exogenous policy indicator. But there 
is disagreement on which single variable must accurately captures the stance 
of policy. This disagreement encourages the researchers to use composite 
measures that includes monetary condition index and an overall measure 
developed by Bernanke and Mihov. Though MCI is considered an 
improvement over other policy indicators it is subject to many criticisms. 
The Bernanke and Mihov approach is assumed to be advantageous over MCI 
as it considers financial variables which may be important in monetary 
transmission mechanism. It nests the quantitative indicators of monetary 
policy. It is applicable to other countries and periods, and to alternative 
institutional setups. In this paper, an attempt is made to avoid some of the 
drawbacks of MCI. We also construct measure developed by Bernanke and 
Mihov. We compare these measures on the basis of certain performance 
criteria i.e. the consistency of estimated weights with economic theory, 
visual inspection vis-à-vis output growth as well as changes in inflation 
(Graphical inspection of turning points), its dynamic correlation with output 
and growth and inflation. The individual coefficients MCI perform better 
than both summarised coefficient MCI and Bernanke-Mihov Measure. The 
results show that in 21-year period from 1984 to 2004, the demand shocks 
have dominated for about 8 years. MCI (IS-Individual coefficient) can 
explain 6 of them. However, it indicates the negative demand shock in two 
years as neutral. The other two measures, however fail to capture demand 
shocks most of the times. This analysis suggests that MCI (IS-Summarised 
coefficient) plays an important role in determining output and inflation when 
the economy is not dominated by supply shocks. The results also show that 
supply shocks are dominant in case of Pakistan. In such a situation, 
monetary policy is less likely to be effective. For example, the 
contractionary policy in response of negative supply shock will further 
accelerate the inflation rather than reducing it. Furthermore, empirical 
findings suggest that exchange rate channel has dominating role over the 
interest rate channel in Pakistan. So exchange rate could be a better policy 
instrument to control the economy. However, this could be dangerous as 
volatility in exchange rate may result into inflation as well as output 
growth’s uncertainty and makes monetary policy more complicated.   16
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